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The use of college athletes’ likenesses in sports-
simulation videogames, such as Electronic Arts’ 
NCAA Football series, has spawned a number of 
lawsuits alleging that such use violates the athletes’ 
rights of publicity.  (These actions have been brought 
by retired college athletes, as the NCAA prohibits 
college athletes from commercially exploiting their 
rights of publicity while in college, as a condition 
of maintaining their “amateur” status.)  Two federal 
Courts of Appeals have now held 2-1 that the First 
Amendment does not protect Electronic Arts’ de-
piction of actual college players, so that EA may be 
held liable under state right of publicity laws.  The 
agreement between the two courts makes it consid-
erably less likely that the Supreme Court will re-
view either one of the cases when it resumes sitting 
in October.
EA’s NCAA Football game strives for realism 
and has achieved it to a large degree.  The in-game 
stadiums depicted look like the actual stadiums on 
college campuses; and the players for each team are 
modeled on the actual players who played for that 
team during the year depicted.  Each in-game play-
er has the same uniform number, height, weight, at-
tributes, and home town as the actual players.  EA 
does not use any names, in order to comply with 
its licensing agreement with the NCAA, in which it 
agrees not to use any actual players; but it is com-
mon for users to upload the names of the players 
from third-party sources.  EA also provides play-
ers with the ability to “customize” any player on 
the roster, so that the user can change the players’ 
height, weight, and other attributes.  Want to insert 
yourself as quarterback of your favorite team?  Go 
right ahead.
In Hart v. Electronic Arts, 717 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 
2013), decided two months ago, [available at http://
www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/113750p.pdf ] 
former Rutgers quarterback Ryan Hart sued EA for 
using his likeness in its videogame.  As there is no 
real doubt that the player depicted was meant to be 
Hart, the prima facie case for liability was pretty 
straightforward: EA used players’ likenesses in a 
product for commercial gain.  The only significant 
question on summary judgment was whether EA’s 
depiction is protected by the First Amendment.  The 
District Court held that the videogame was protect-
ed by the First Amendment, a ruling that the Third 
Circuit panel reversed.
Similarly, in Keller v. Electronic Arts, No. 
10-15387 (9th Cir. July 31, 2013), [available 
at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opin-
ions/2013/07/31/10-15387.pdf ] there was no real 
doubt that the player depicted was meant to be for-
mer Arizona State and Nebraska quarterback Sam 
Keller.  The Keller case was consolidated with a 
similar suit filed by former UCLA basketball player 
Ed O’Bannon and several others, which also chal-
lenged the NCAA’s restriction against players ex-
ploiting their rights of publicity while in college as 
an antitrust violation.  (Only the First Amendment 
issue was decided in this opinion; the antitrust issue 
remains pending.  Probably as a result, the NCAA 
has announced that it will no longer license EA af-
ter the forthcoming 2014 game, leaving individual 
colleges and universities to strike their own deals 
with EA.  EA has already signed an extension with 
the Collegiate Licensing Company, which controls 
trademark licensing for a large number of colleges 
and universities.)
Keller also involved a significant procedural 
complication.  The First Amendment issue was 
raised not in a motion for summary judgment, but 
in a special motion to strike under California’s anti-
SLAPP law.  SLAPP is an acronym for “strategic 
lawsuits against public participation,” and such 
statutes are “designed to discourage suits that mas-
querade as ordinary lawsuits but are brought to de-
ter common citizens from exercising their political 
or legal rights or to punish them for doing so [cita-
tion omitted].” California law allows a defendant 
in such a case to raise the First Amendment issue 
at the outset of the case, using a special motion to 
strike.  The standard, however, is lenient: although 
the statute requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that 
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it has a “reasonable probability” that it will prevail, 
courts have watered down the statute by interpreting 
it as allowing the lawsuit to proceed unless the de-
fendant would prevail under the First Amendment 
as a matter of law.  Applying this standard, the dis-
trict court held that EA was not protected by the 
First Amendment as a matter of law, and the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed.  Thus, EA could theoretically still 
prevail at trial if the trier of fact found certain facts 
(discussed below) in its favor; but as a practical 
matter, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is unlikely to be 
contradicted.
Background: Competing First Amendment Standards
An important question is what First Amendment 
analysis will be used in such lawsuits.  Courts fac-
ing First Amendment questions in right of public-
ity cases have set forth a large variety of different 
analyses.  In the only U.S. Supreme Court opinion 
to date, the Court held that the First Amendment 
“do[es] not immunize the media when they broad-
cast a performer’s entire act without his consent.” 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 
U.S. 562 (1977).  That case involved a 15-second 
clip of a human cannonball at a local county fair, 
shown on the local TV station’s news broadcast. 
Unfortunately, the Court did not set forth any sort 
of general approach to deciding claims of this type, 
leaving lower courts to sort out the issues in later 
cases.  In particular, the Court did not adopt (or 
even refer to) either the “strict scrutiny” analysis 
typically used for content-based restrictions or the 
“intermediate scrutiny” analysis typically used 
for content-neutral restrictions that implicate First 
Amendment interests.  Interestingly, lower courts 
have declined to adopt either of these more general 
standards as well, and instead have largely preferred 
to use standards that are unique to the intellectual 
property context.
In two cases involving Clint Eastwood and the 
National Enquirer, in which Eastwood alleged that 
the tabloid knowingly printed false stories about 
him and advertised them on its cover in order to in-
crease its circulation, courts have used the familiar 
standard from libel law, first set forth in New York 
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), under which 
a publisher may not be held liable for mere negli-
gence in printing a false story about a public figure, 
but may only have damages imposed if it acted with 
“actual malice,” that is, if it knew the story was false 
or if it acted with reckless disregard as to its falsity. 
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 
198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983); Eastwood v. National 
Enquirer, 123 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1997).  Bizarrely, 
the same standard was used in a case in which 
Dustin Hoffman claimed that his likeness was used 
without permission in an article in L.A. Magazine, 
in which a still photograph of Hoffman in drag from 
the movie “Tootsie” was altered by superimposing 
another model’s body wearing a different dress, 
despite the fact that all parties agreed that L.A. 
Magazine did not try to “pass off” the photograph 
as real.  Indeed, the whole point of the story was 
to show famous scenes featuring Hollywood icons, 
digitally altered to wear modern fashion styles.  The 
Ninth Circuit held that the magazine article was 
protected by re-interpreting the test to inquire not 
whether the magazine knew that the depiction was 
false, but whether it had knowingly (and falsely) 
represented either that it was true, or that Hoffman 
had consented (finding a lack of evidence on both 
counts).  Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 
F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
In a notorious case, game show hostess Vanna 
White sued Samsung for an advertisement that 
depicted a robot in a blonde wig and evening 
gown, turning letters on a Wheel-of-Fortune game 
board.  Because the ad was “commercial speech,” 
a majority of the Ninth Circuit panel gave the First 
Amendment argument short shrift, dismissing 
it in a single short paragraph.  White v. Samsung 
Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 
1992).  White was subsequently awarded $400,000 
in damages.  Judge Kozinski’s opinion dissenting 
from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing from 
stronger First Amendment protection, has become 
a staple of law-school casebooks.  989 F.2d 1512 
(9th Cir. 1993).  White is arguably inconsistent with 
the later U.S. Supreme Court decision in Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), which 
held that an alleged rap parody of the popular song 
Pretty Woman could qualify as a parody protected 
by the copyright fair use doctrine.  Moreover, in a 
later case involving parody baseball cards, the Tenth 
Circuit expressly disagreed with White, holding that 
the First Amendment protected lampoons of active 
professional baseball players (such as the depic-
tion of slugger Barry Bonds as “Treasury Bonds”). 
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).  There, the 
Court systematically analyzed the effect of a hypo-
thetical injunction on the right of free speech, and 
balanced it against the effect of a hypothetical rul-
ing against the players on the right of publicity.  The 
court examined seven rationales advanced for the 
right of publicity, and found either that each was 
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unpersuasive or that it would not be significantly 
advanced by a ruling in favor of the players.
In Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 
1989), actress Ginger Rogers sued the produc-
ers of a movie entitled “Ginger and Fred,” about 
a fictional pair of Italian dancers who were com-
pared to Rogers and Astaire and acquired the nick-
names “Ginger and Fred.”  Her suit was based on 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (false endorse-
ment) as well as Oregon right of publicity.  The 
Second Circuit rejected a proposed standard drawn 
from a real property case, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 
407 U.S. 551 (1972), in which the court held that 
the First Amendment did not require states to allow 
distribution of handbills on private property unless 
there were “no alternative avenues of expression.” 
Instead, the Second Circuit held that the Lanham 
Act was outweighed by the First Amendment “un-
less the title has no artistic relevance to the under-
lying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic 
relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to 
the source or the content of the work.”  The court 
applied a similar standard to the right of publicity 
claim, holding that the First Amendment prevailed 
“unless the title was wholly unrelated to the movie 
or was simply a disguised commercial advertise-
ment for the sale of goods or services.”  Both the 
Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have subse-
quently expanded the reach of the Rogers test to 
the use of trademarks in the content of expressive 
works.  Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday, 
Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989); Mattel, Inc. v. 
MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); E.S.S. 
Entertainment, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 
F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008).  The Rogers test is very 
protective of free speech.  The only appellate case 
in which the defendant failed to satisfy the Rogers 
standard is Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 
(6th Cir. 2003), in which Rosa Parks successfully 
sued over the use of her name as the title of a rap 
song which used the phrase “Everybody move to 
the back of the bus,” but not as a reference to seg-
regation.  The court held that the song was “wholly 
unrelated” to the civil rights icon.
Two cases involving works of art introduced two 
additional First Amendment analyses.  In Comedy 
III Prods v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 106 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 126 (2001), the California Supreme 
Court held that reproductions of a charcoal draw-
ing of the Three Stooges were not protected by the 
First Amendment.  Despite rejecting six proffered 
reasons why the lithographs and t-shirts might not 
be protected by the First Amendment, the court held 
that the First Amendment interest was outweighed 
by the right of publicity unless the use was “trans-
formative,” a term borrowed from the copyright 
“fair use” doctrine.  “When artistic expression takes 
the form of a literal depiction or imitation of a ce-
lebrity for commercial gain, . . . the state interest in 
protecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the 
expressive interests of the imitative artist.  On the 
other hand, when a work contains significant trans-
formative elements, . . . First Amendment protec-
tion of such works outweighs whatever interest the 
state may have in enforcing the right of publicity.” 
The Saderup court added two additional inquiries. 
“Another way of stating the inquiry is whether the 
celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from 
which an original work is synthesized, or wheth-
er the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the 
very sum and substance of the work in question. 
. . . Furthermore, in determine whether a work is 
sufficiently transformative, courts may find useful 
a subsidiary inquiry . . .: does the marketability and 
economic value of the challenged work derive pri-
marily from the fame of the celebrity depicted . . . 
[or] from the creativity, skill, and reputation of the 
artist[?]”
In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 
915 (6th Cir. 2003), however, the Sixth Circuit held 
that reproductions of a painting of Tiger Woods 
winning the 1997 Masters golf tournament were 
protected by the First Amendment.  The court found 
that the Saderup “transformative” standard was sat-
isfied; but it also applied the Rogers v. Grimaldi 
standard, and a third standard, taken from the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 47, 
cmt. c, which states that “the use of a person’s iden-
tity primarily for the purpose of communicating 
information or expressing ideas is not generally ac-
tionable as a violation of the person’s right of pub-
licity,” unless the name or likeness is used solely to 
attract attention to a work that is not related to the 
identified person, or if the work contains substantial 
falsifications.  In a meandering opinion, the Court 
held that the poster was protected under any of the 
three standards.
Cases involving the use of real people as models 
for comic-book characters have also reached diver-
gent results.  In Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal. 4th 
881, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 634 (2003), singers Johnny 
and Edgar Winter were depicted in a Jonah Hex 
comic book series as “Johnny and Edgar Autumn,” 
two half-worm, half-human villains, or “vile, de-
praved, stupid, cowardly, subhuman individuals 
who engage in wanton acts of violence, murder and 
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bestiality for pleasure and who should be killed.” 
The California Supreme Court unanimously held 
that the comic book met the “transformative” 
standard of Saderup and was protected by the 
First Amendment.  But when hockey player Tony 
Twist’s name was used by writer Todd McFarlane 
as the name of a Mafia don in the comic book se-
ries Spawn, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected 
both the Restatement and the “transformative” 
standard, adopting instead a “predominant use” test 
(proposed by a prominent right-of-publicity plain-
tiff’s attorney in a law review article), which looks 
at whether the product “predominantly exploits the 
commercial value of an individual’s identity, . . . 
even if there is some ‘expressive’ content in it that 
might qualify as ‘speech’ in other circumstances.” 
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 
2003).  [McFarlane was significantly damaged by 
his apparent attempt to ward off a defamation claim 
by claiming that his Mafia don was not a comment 
on the real Tony Twist, and by the fact that he occa-
sionally marketed Spawn and related merchandise 
to hockey fans.]  Not surprisingly, given its origin, 
this standard is most protective of celebrities and 
most hostile to free speech.
Choosing a Standard
So, which of these competing standards should 
be used in the videogame cases?  Both Cardtoons 
and White are pretty clearly limited to parody cases, 
and Eastwood is pretty clearly limited to false news 
reports masquerading as true (despite the Hoffman 
departure).  That still leaves three (or four) stan-
dards: Rogers, the Restatement standard (to the 
extent it differs), the Saderup “transformative” 
standard, and the Doe “predominant use” standard.
The Hart opinion criticized the “predominant 
use” test as “subjective at best, arbitrary at worst,” 
and for requiring courts “to analyze select elements 
of a work to determine how much they contribute 
to the entire work’s expressiveness.”  Moreover, the 
court said, adopting this test “would suppose that 
there exists a broad range of seemingly expressive 
speech that has no First Amendment value.”
Both Hart and Keller rejected application of the 
Rogers test.  The Hart court was concerned that the 
Rogers test was “a blunt instrument, unfit for wide-
spread application in cases that require carefully 
calibrated balancing,” and suggested that “adopt-
ing this test would potentially immunize a broad 
swath of tortious activity.”  In particular, the court 
was concerned that the “wholly unrelated” stan-
dard would be easily met by any product targeted 
at sports fans.  “It cannot be that the very activity 
by which [Hart] achieved his renown now prevents 
him from protecting his hard-won celebrity.”
Both Hart and Keller suggested that the Sixth 
Circuit’s use of Rogers in the Parks case was less 
persuasive because the same court, in deciding 
ETW a few months later, did not clearly use Rogers, 
but also relied on the Restatement and Saderup. 
However, both courts also indicated that the Rogers 
standard should continue to be applied to false en-
dorsement cases brought under the Lanham Act. 
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit so held in a companion 
case brought by former professional football player 
Jim Brown, in which the state-law right of publicity 
claims were dismissed for lack of diversity jurisdic-
tion after the federal Lanham Act claim was decid-
ed.”  Brown v. Electronic Arts, No. 09-56675 (9th Cir. 
July 31, 2013) [available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.
gov/datastore/opinions/2013/07/31/09-56675.pdf ] 
The Keller court noted that Rogers was designed 
“to protect consumers against the risk of consumer 
confusion — the hallmark element of a Lanham 
Act claim,” whereas “[t]he right of publicity pro-
tects the celebrity, not the consumer,” and does not 
require any showing of confusion.
This double standard makes little sense.  Serving 
the public interest by protecting against consumer 
confusion should be a stronger, more compelling 
government interest than protecting the purely 
private interest of the celebrity, yet both courts 
would apply a much more speech-protective First 
Amendment standard in cases involving the former 
interest than in cases involving the latter.  Moreover, 
in Rogers itself, the Second Circuit applied a near-
ly-identical analysis to the right of publicity claim 
as it did to the Lanham Act claim. Yet Keller says 
that it did so only because “Oregon courts . . . [had] 
not determined the scope of the common-law right 
of publicity in that state,” whereas four California 
courts have already applied the Saderup “transfor-
mative” standard. Thus, the Keller court bizarrely 
suggests that the Rogers “wholly unrelated” stan-
dard was merely a federal court’s Erie prediction 
about a matter of state tort law, rather than a federal 
First Amendment limitation on state tort law.
Instead, both Hart and Keller applied the 
Saderup “transformative” standard.  The Keller 
court did so essentially by default, whereas the Hart 
court said that the “transformative” standard “ap-
pears to strike the best balance because it provides 
courts with a flexible — yet uniformly applicable 
— analytical framework,” and because it thought it 
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was consistent with most of the previously decided 
cases.
Applying the Standard
A fundamental question when applying the 
Saderup standard is: what is it that has to be “trans-
formative”?  Does the celebrity likeness itself have 
be “transformative”?  Or is it sufficient if the work 
as a whole is “transformative”?  Saderup itself 
consistently indicates that the inquiry is whether 
the “work” is transformative.  [That is also true in 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, the U.S. Supreme 
Court case discussing the copyright fair use doc-
trine from which the California Supreme Court bor-
rowed the “transformative” inquiry.]  Yet both Hart 
and Keller hold instead that what matters is wheth-
er the depiction of the celebrity is transformative, 
rather than the work as a whole.  Instead of look-
ing to Saderup, Keller instead relied on a California 
Court of Appeal case, No Doubt v. Activision 
Publishing, 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018, 122 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 397 (2011), in which a rock band successfully 
sued the makers of the videogame Band Hero, for 
including avatars of the band members in a video-
game that allowed those avatars to perform songs 
other than those made popular by the band, a flex-
ibility that exceeded the scope of the license that 
the band members had granted.  The Keller court 
thus (somewhat strangely) abdicated its role as a 
federal court to construe federal law, and instead 
deferred to a state court’s view of federal law.  The 
Hart court also relied on No Doubt, but it further 
justified its decision on the ground that otherwise, 
“[a]cts of blatant misappropriation would count for 
nothing so long as the larger work, on balance, con-
tained contained highly creative elements in great 
abundance.”
A further question is: of what significance it is 
that avatars can be altered by the users?  This fact 
potentially distinguishes Hart and Keller from No 
Doubt, in which the court specifically noted that the 
avatars could not be altered.  Nonetheless, the Hart 
court held that the ability to alter avatars was not 
material, because the realism associated with real 
players was an important factor in getting consum-
ers to buy the product.  This reasoning suggests a 
possible work-around, in which EA distributes the 
game with “generic” avatars at each position, and 
lets users modify the avatars themselves.  (There is 
little doubt that a market for user-generated content 
supplying the various “attributes” would immedi-
ately arise, but then litigation might have to be di-
rected at the suppliers of such content, rather than at 
the EA videogame itself.  Surely the fact that EA’s 
avatars are capable of being modified to represent 
people of different height, weight, ethnicity, etc., 
cannot itself be a basis for liability.)
Not surprisingly, given this narrow focus on the 
avatars themselves and discounting all of the other 
contributions of EA’s artists and programmers, in-
cluding the ability of users to alter the avatars, both 
courts held that the avatars were not transformative, 
and therefore they were not protected by the First 
Amendment.  In both cases, however, one of the 
three judges dissented on exactly these two issues: 
that in deciding whether the works were “transfor-
mative,” the court should consider the game as a 
whole, and especially the ability of users to alter the 
avatars to their own liking.
A further irony is that all of the attributes that 
“identify” the football players: their numbers, po-
sitions, height, weight, ethnicity, hometown, etc., 
and all of the statistics on which the “random” al-
gorithms controlling the videogame are based, are 
publicly available information.  The Eight Circuit 
has already held that the use of such publicly avail-
able information in providing commercial fantasy 
sports products to the public is protected by the 
First Amendment.  C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. 
v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 
505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).  The only difference 
between using statistics to run a fantasy football 
game and using statistics to run a fantasy football 
videogame is the visual element.  Essentially, the 
court holds that the visual element — the depiction 
of a body type similar to a celebrity, imitating the 
celebrity — is enough to take the game out of realm 
of fully protected speech and to put it into the same 
category with plastic action figures, coffee mugs, 
and other celebrity merchandise.  If taken literally, 
the opinions in Hart and Keller could be read to bar 
the literal depiction of a celebrity in a work of his-
torical fiction, such as Forrest Gump, or a “docudra-
ma” such as the movie 42 (about Jackie Robinson). 
I am confident that this will not come to pass, and 
that courts will continue to give First Amendment 
protection to depictions of real people in “tradition-
al” entertainment media, such as movies and televi-
sion, even when lightly (or heavily) fictionalized. 
See, e.g., Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 
25 Cal. 3d 860, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979) (fic-
tional movie about Rudolf Valentino); Tyne v. Time 
Warner Entertainment Co., 901 So.2d 802 (Fla. 
2005) (suit by heirs of the fisherman depicted in the 
movie The Perfect Storm); Ruffin-Steinback v. de-
Passe, 267 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2001) (TV miniseries 
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about singing group The Temptations).  But the fact 
that courts cannot yet articulate a consistent First 
Amendment standard that distinguishes between 
the literal depiction of a celebrity in a sports-sim-
ulation videogame and the literal depiction of a ce-
lebrity in a more traditional work of entertainment 
strongly suggests that courts simply do not place 
the same value on the videogame medium as they 
do on more traditional media.  For a extensive re-
buttal to this apparent discrimination, see William 
K. Ford and Raizel Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee 
Mugs: Games and the Right of Publicity, 29 Santa 
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1 (2012) [avail-
able at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/
vol29/iss1/1 ]
Although there was a split at the district court 
level, the fact that both the Third Circuit and the 
Ninth Circuit reached the same result, using almost 
the same reasoning, significantly decreases the like-
lihood that the U.S. Supreme Court will grant re-
view.  That possibility is further diminished by the 
procedural posture of the Keller case: the Supreme 
Court prefers to review final judgments, rather than 
intermediate rulings in cases in which significant 
court proceedings are still to come.  EA would be 
better off filing a petition for rehearing en banc in 
the Keller case.  (It has already filed such a petition 
in Hart).   Only two Ninth Circuit judges voted in 
the Keller case, and they split on the result.  The de-
ciding vote was cast by a Senior U.S. District Judge 
from the Western District of Michigan, sitting by 
designation. (Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Tashima 
formed part of the majority in Hart while sitting by 
designation on the Third Circuit, but judges with 
senior status are not eligible to vote on petitions for 
rehearing.)  If a majority of the 27 active judges 
of the Ninth Circuit vote to grant review, the case 
would be reheard by a panel of 11 judges, including 
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, a videogame aficiona-
do who has twice previously expressed support for 
a robust First Amendment test in right of public-
ity cases, and who used the Rogers standard in his 
opinion in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 
894 (9th Cir. 2002).  If either en banc court were to 
reach a different result, then the parties would have 
a much better chance of getting the U.S. Supreme 
Court to review the case.
*   *   *
